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A B ST R ACT. The text of a Supreme Court opinion rarely tells the full story of the debates,
discussions, and disagreements that resulted in a particular decision. Drawing on previously
unexamined archival papers of the Justices of the Burger Court, this Note tells the story of the
Burger Court's federalism jurisprudence between 1975 and 1985, famously bookended by a pair
of rare and abrupt reversals of Supreme Court precedent. The Note documents the Justices'
deliberations for the first time, sheds new light on the institutional workings of the Court, and
enriches our understanding of the foundations of modern federalism. In its federalism cases, the
Burger Court grappled with the challenge of balancing the states' autonomy against the rise of
new national problems and an expanding federal government's solutions to them. The Justices'
papers show that they were more attuned to policy outcomes and the real-world consequences of
their decisions than may typically be assumed. Above all, the papers reveal the Burger Court's
deep struggle to articulate a sustainable federalism jurisprudence given the constraints of judicial
craft. As the Note concludes, however, the Burger Court's uneven federalism experiments
nonetheless laid the groundwork for the Court's subsequent attempts to fashion more workable
doctrines. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have adjudicated federalism disputes more
effectively by avoiding impracticable doctrines and remaining mindful of the institutional
limitations of courts as federalism referees.
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INTRODUCTION
"The problem is how best to accommodate the commerce clause and federalism
when they collide."
- Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 1975.1
Drawing on the rich archival materials preserved by the Justices, this Note
provides the first detailed account of the story behind the federalism
jurisprudence of the Burger Court. It is the first piece of scholarship to examine
at length the papers of the members of the Burger Court-Justices Blackmun
and Powell in particular-on the major federalism decisions decided by the
Court in the late 1970s and early 198os. These letters, memos, and draft
opinions help explain the seemingly incoherent genealogy of the Burger
Court's federalism jurisprudence, illuminate the Court's influence on our
contemporary federalism doctrines, and enrich our understanding of how the
nation's highest court functions as an institution.
The stories this Note tells revolve around two pivotal five-four decisions of
the Court: National League of Cities v. Usery,2 decided in 1976, and Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,' decided nine years later in 1985. Cities
signaled the beginning of the Court's modern federalism jurisprudence: in
striking down a federal statute that regulated state and local employees'
salaries, it became the first case in decades to overturn a federal law on
federalism grounds. Cities resurrected the Tenth Amendment as something
more than the mere "truism" the Court had declared it three decades earlier in
United States v. Darby.4 Widely seen as a landmark ruling at the time it came
down, Cities held that the Tenth Amendment protected the states' "traditional
governmental functions" from undue intrusion by the federal government.s
Despite Cities's potentially far-reaching implications, it was surprisingly hard
to implement; in subsequent cases, the Court would repeatedly avoid
application of its holding before finally abandoning the project altogether in
Garcia.
Understanding this turn of events remains relevant to present-day
federalism debates. The Burger Court's federalism decisions -some of which
1. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. for Conference in Nat'l League of Cities v.
Dunlop 1 (Apr. 17, 1975) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 74-878).
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
3. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
4. 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered.").




were, according to Justice Powell, among "the most important" cases to come
before him6 - set in motion the doctrine that continues to govern the balance
between Congress's Commerce Clause powers and the Tenth Amendment's
protection of state prerogatives. The Supreme Court's federalism cases are
among its most impactful in recent decades, as federalism has become a
battleground for an increasing number of policy clashes.' Revisiting the origins
of modern federalism helps us appreciate how the doctrine developed into its
current form.
In telling the story of the Burger Court's federalism decisions, I focus on
three periods. The first is marked by the dramatic revival of the Tenth
Amendment in the mid-1970s with Fry v. United States" and Cities. Drawing on
previously unexamined archives, this Note reveals how behind-the-scenes
maneuvers in Fry set the stage for the Court's landmark decision in Cities. On
the surface, Fry's seven-one decision against the States-relying on Warren
Court precedents - seems hard to square with Cities's five-four decisionfor the
States only a year later. After all, Cities overturned those same Warren Court
precedents. As my research reveals, however, an insurgent rebellion by three
Justices in Fry resulted in a muted compromise opinion that said little but
deliberately left open the possibility for the Court's resuscitation of the Tenth
Amendment a year later in Cities.
The second period, from roughly 1981 to 1983, finds the Court struggling
to apply the "traditional governmental functions" doctrine that it had
articulated in Cities. The archival materials reveal that the Justices were closely
attuned to the practical consequences of deciding for or against the States, and
were more open-minded about both sides of the debate than is commonly
thought. The Justices' focus on real-world effects also helps explain Cities's
gradual desuetude: as the activities of states and private actors increasingly
converged, merged, or blurred, the theory of traditional governmental
functions first announced in Cities was thwarted by the practical challenges of
applying it in case after case.
6. See infra notes 11o-1ii and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARv. L. REv. 1077 (2014) (arguing
that partisan commitments - not abstract attachments to federalism per se - motivate much
of the federalism debates in the United States); Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)'s Forms and
Norms: Contesting Rights, De-Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing
Accommodations, in NoMos LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 363, 365 (James E. Fleming &
Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) ("[F]ederalism's plural legal sources . . . enable[] norm
entrepreneurs to shop systems to persuade [others] about the wisdom or the legality of
particular points of view-for or against, for example, openness toward new immigrants,
state mandates for health care, or environmental regulations.").
8. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
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The third and pivotal period, beginning in 1984, finds the Court in
upheaval over Justice Blackmun's about-face in Garcia. Mere weeks before his
majority opinion was scheduled for publication, he would switch sides and join
the dissenters in overturning Cities. The opinion he ultimately wrote in Garcia
appears deeply indebted to one of his clerks, who urged Justice Blackmun to
reverse himself- and take the Court with him.
This original historical account enhances our understanding of modem
American federalism by illuminating the context in which the Supreme Court
issued its opinions.9 I argue that the Burger Court's struggles reflect two
ongoing tensions in the Court's federalism jurisprudence. The first is the
tension between purity and pragmatism. The Burger Court's behind-the-
scenes deliberations reveal the Justices struggling mightily to apply and refine
the conceptually neat "traditional governmental functions" doctrine laid down
in Cities. Simple enough in theory, the Cities test proved difficult to apply in
practice. Close examination of the papers reveals that several Justices - not only
Justice Blackmun- struggled to find a practicable way to identify protected
functions. As Justice Blackmun ultimately concluded when he overturned
Cities, "Attempts by other courts ... to draw guidance from this model have
proved it both impracticable and doctrinally barren.""o
The Burger Court's federalism jurisprudence also raised a second tension-
one which I do not believe has been discussed elsewhere, and which was
especially relevant to members of the Court more inclined to favor state
sovereignty. Although Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell appeared at
times to be ardent defenders of state prerogatives, they were not always so
confident behind the scenes. I argue that this was in part because the
conservative Justices became prisoners of their own doctrine. Cities's traditional
governmental functions test led to a catch-22: the only way to protect the states
was to essentialize certain services-which might otherwise be privately
provided - as quintessentially governmental." Expanding the judicially endorsed
reach of the state would have been an unfamiliar position for conservative
jurists like Justice Powell, who were inclined to favor free enterprise over an
expansive, socializing government.1 2 Thus, the Burger Court's federalism
g. For a discussion of the importance of understanding the context in which a court encounters
a decision, see Judith Resnik, Constructing the Canon, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 221 (1990).
Judith Resnik calls on readers, in interpreting judicial texts and the thinking of judges, to
"speak of what judges say not only when they sit on the bench but also when they wheel and
deal in settlement conferences, [and] when they speak ex parte, on and off 'the record' . . . .
Id. at 229.
io. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
11. See infra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.




doctrine contained a second tension: probusiness conservatives were forced to
choose between essentializing services as governmental at the local level or
expanding the government's reach at the federal level.
To fully understand the federalism doctrines of the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts, then, we must situate them in the context of the Burger Court's
jurisprudence. The Burger Court's federalism cases illustrate pitfalls inherent
in policing the boundary between functions of the states and the federal
government that later Courts have sought to avoid. While the tensions the
Burger Court encountered are not unique to that era -adjudicating federal-
state disputes has been among the Court's most controversial functions since
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee' -the focus of the debate has shifted in recent years.
In response to the struggles of the Burger Court, I argue, the federalism
jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts has homed in on more
clearly definable aspects of states, such as the commandeering (in Printz v.
United States)' or coercion (in New York v. United States' and National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius) " of state actors. These categories
are more readily identifiable, if no less hotly contested. 7 Moreover, they free
conservative-minded jurists from choosing between state sovereignty and free
enterprise.
The Justices' papers -especially the remarkably thorough and carefully
preserved conference notes of Justices Blackmun and Powell - also provide
insight into the workings of the Supreme Court as an institution. In part, the
archival materials confirm what legal realists have long suspected about the
craft of judicial decision making: the Court was focused more on policy,
outcomes, and real-world consequences than its sometimes abstract-sounding
opinions might suggest. The Justices' papers show that they often concentrated
on the practical challenges and problems each individual case raised, debating
at conference the anticipated effects of their proposed decisions. In the frequent
13. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
14. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) ("The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring
the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.").
15. 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) ("Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion,
elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in
matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.").
16. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (describing the "danger" that Congress's spending clause
powers might pose in imposing pressure on the states to accept federal funding to
implement federal prerogatives).
17. For recent criticism of the anti-commandeering and anti-coercion principles, see Andrew B.
Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of American Federalism, 95 B.U. L.
REv. 1, 13-18 (2015).
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absence of straightforward constitutional resolution, the members of the
Burger Court were left to weigh the costs and benefits of each challenged law.
From their papers, the members of the Burger Court also appear more
open-minded and less rigidly ideological than might be assumed.
Correspondence among the Justices and their clerks produced substantial
changes of opinion. The Justices' notes and internal memoranda show that
they sometimes changed their votes even after circulation of majority and
dissenting drafts, revealing a Court whose members were very responsive to
their colleagues' efforts at persuasion. Nor were the Justices afraid to second-
guess themselves. Justice Blackmun, for example, was a member of the Cities
majority and was originally assigned to write the opinion in Garcia reaffirming
Cities. Yet he changed his mind and ultimately wrote the decision that
overruled Cities. In another case, both the Chief Justice and Justice Powell
changed positions after the Conference vote." Especially in light of criticism
that the modern Court is predictably partisan,2 o the Justices' willingness to
consider both sides of important issues (and even change their minds)
indicates that the Court's members were more freethinking than their
published opinions might suggest or than their critics might assume.
The Justices of the Burger Court were receptive not only to their colleagues'
views, but also to the input of their law clerks. Justice Blackmun's clerks appear
to have been especially successful in shaping his ideas. The Justice's papers
strongly suggest that his reversal in Garcia was influenced by one clerk's
dogged insistence that Cities's traditional governmental functions test was
unworkable. Even Blackmun's concurrence in Cities seems partly in debt to a
clerk's conviction that the Justice should write separately to temper the
majority's holding. While this Note is not the first effort to assess the role of
clerks in Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence,' it is the first to do so in the
specific context of his federalism decisions and to tell the story of how one
18. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 187 (1983) (arguing that the Burger
Court exhibited a distinct ideological approach to criminal procedure); Timothy M. Hagle &
Harold J. Spaeth, The Emergence of a New Ideology: The Business Decisions of the Burger Court,
54 J. POL. 120 (1992) (arguing that the Burger Court's business decisions evince an ideology
of "instrumental libertarianism").
ig. See infra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
20. E.g., Garrett Epps, The Extreme Partisanship ofJohn Roberts's Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (Aug.
27, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2o14/o8/john-robertss-dream-of-a
-unifying-court-has-dissolved/379220 [http://perma.cc/6G8R-V2LG].
21. See David J. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, LEGAL AFF. (May/June 2005), http://





clerk's advocacy appears to have helped persuade Justice Blaclanun to reverse
course in Garcia.
In short, the stories contained in the Justices' archival papers-told here
for the first time- contribute to our understanding of the Supreme Court as an
institution, the operations of the Burger Court in particular, and the Burger
Court's federalism doctrine, which continues to shape debates on American
federalism to this day.
I. THE TENTH AMENDMENT REANIMATED: FRY & NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES (1975-76)
A. Inheriting the NationalistJurisprudence of the Warren Court
In the Burger Court's first period of major federalism decisions, between
1975 and 1976, the Court began to break free of the nationalist precedents it
inherited from the Warren Court. While the Burger Court's first big
Commerce Clause federalism case, Fry v. United States," appeared to maintain
the status quo, behind the scenes the new Justices of the Burger Court were
sowing seeds that would bear fruit in National League of Cities v. Usery the
following year. The Tenth Amendment, long dormant, would see new life.
The Supreme Court had generally endorsed the expansion of federal power
in the years between the New Deal and the resignation of Chief Justice Warren
in 1969. This was especially true in the context of antidiscrimination law. In
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States' and Katzenbach v. McClung,'4 the
Warren Court unanimously upheld the application of the Civil Rights Act's
prohibition on discrimination to privately owned and operated businesses, as
well as to the states. The Court found that Congress could regulate such
businesses under the Commerce Clause because collectively, the economic
activities of these privately owned businesses "directly or indirectly burden[ed]
or obstruct[ed] interstate commerce."25
The Warren Court also endorsed an expansive vision of the federal
government's power over the states in voting-rights cases such as South
Carolina v. Katzenbach26 and Katzenbach v. Morgan.' This expansion of federal
22. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
23. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
24. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
25. Id. at 302.
26. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
27. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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power was facilitated in part by the desuetude of the Tenth Amendment, which
was not discussed in these cases." Twenty-five years earlier, in United States v.
Darby, the Court had unanimously declared that the Tenth Amendment stated
a mere "truism" and stood for nothing more than the uncontroversial
proposition that the federal government could not exercise powers not granted
to it by the Constitution.' After Darby, as one scholar explained, "the Tenth
Amendment came to have no restrictive significance" in protecting the states
from interference by the federal government.3 o
The Burger Court reshaped the constitutional landscape by resurrecting the
Tenth Amendment as an independent source of constitutional protection for
the states. The Warren Court's last major federalism case, Maryland v. Wirtz,3
exemplified the nation's evolving federalism battlegrounds. Decided in 1968, a
year before Burger was appointed Chief Justice, Wirtz involved a challenge to
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The statute applied minimum-wage and
overtime requirements to employees of state-operated schools and hospitals.
The States argued that the law impermissibly impaired their sovereign
prerogatives to manage the covered institutions by interfering with states'
employment arrangements. A seven-member majority of the Court disagreed,
refusing to limit Congress's power to regulate economic enterprises "simply
because those enterprises happen to be run by the states."
Other members of the Court, however, were more troubled by the FLSA's
application to state employees. In his dissent, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice
28. In contrast to the lack of engagement with the Tenth Amendment in the pair of Warren
Court Katzenbach Voting Rights Act cases, Chief Justice Roberts drew broadly on the Tenth
Amendment in his opinion in Shelby County v. Holder, which overturned provisions of the
Voting Rights Act. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) ("But the federal balance is not just an end in
itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power .... More specifically, the Framers of the Constitution intended the States
to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate
elections.").
29. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The amendment states but a truism that
all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the
national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able
to exercise fully their reserved powers.").
30. Sotirios A. Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth
Amendment?, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 162.
31. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
32. Id. at 185-87.




Stewart, sought to exhume the Tenth Amendment, characterizing the FLSA
provisions as "such a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the
Tenth Amendment" that they were inconsistent with "our constitutional
federalism."" This argument-that the Tenth Amendment placed concrete
limits on Congress's Commerce Clause powers-was not addressed by the
majority, consistent with the Court's dismissive treatment of the Tenth
Amendment in the years before the Burger Court.
After Wirtz, seven years passed before the Supreme Court again heard a
federalism challenge to Congress's Commerce Clause power. By the time the
Court was rendering its decision in Fry, its composition had changed
dramatically. Burger had become the Chief Justice, and President Nixon had
appointed three other Justices to the Court-Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist,
and Powell. Despite the addition of these new, more conservative members, the
Court's decision in Fry suggested that not much had changed -at least from
the text of the opinion. Justice Marshall, writing for a seven-member majority,
upheld Congress's emergency wage controls over the states in a short,
straightforward opinion that barely spanned five columns of the Supreme
Court Reporter."s
The Justices' papers, however, tell a different story. In fact, there had been
considerable acrimony over the decision among the new Nixon appointees, and
they worked behind the scenes in Fry to plant the seeds of rebellion against
Wirtz. Fry's laconic holding was the direct result of compromises made after
the three new Nixon appointees threatened to jump ship and write their own
concurrence. The holding in Marshall's original draft in Fry was much broader
than the final result, expressly rejecting the idea that the FLSA impinged on
state sovereignty and emphasizing that the law "did not purport to impose
substantive restrictions on the functions the States could perform.", 6
By the time Marshall had circulated that draft, however, the Court was
considering another federalism challenge in the case that would become
Cities." Powell wrote in the margins of his copy of the draft opinion that, with
Cities making its way to the Court, the Court should either "hold [Fry] for that
34. Id. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
3. 95 S. Ct. 1792 (1975). Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id, at 1796 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas wrote a short concurrence arguing that the case should have
been dismissed as improvidently granted. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
36. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Draft Opinion in Fry v. United States 6 (Jan. 9, 1975) (on file
with Harry A. Blacknun Papers, Box 196, Folder 73-822).
37. The Court noted probable jurisdiction in the combined cases that became Cities on January
27, 1975, several weeks after Marshall circulated his first draft. See 420 U.S. 906 (1975).
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or write this more narrowly." , Powell circulated a memo to Marshall and the
rest of the Justices expressing concern that Marshall's language would
"strengthen the force of Wirtz as a precedent and possibly be viewed as
extending Wirtz."" The language would "g[ol a long way to pre-judge
National League of Cities."40 He requested that Marshall scale back the
discussion of Wirtz and instead emphasize the emergency nature of the
temporary wage ceilings. 4' The seeds of an insurrection planted, Justice
Blackmun responded in a memorandum to Marshall and the conference that
there was "much to be said" for Powell's point of view. 2  Then-Justice
Rehnquist agreed,43 despite originally voting at conference to dismiss the case
as improvidently granted."
Marshall, senior to all three of the newer Justices, was indignant and
refused to alter course, stating that his proposed holding in Fry was "carefully
cut to the bone and about as narrow a holding as I can imagine."4 Rehnquist
responded that he would write a dissent,46 and Powell proposed a short, one-
page concurrence, emphasizing the emergency nature of the Act and reiterating
that "principles of federalism impose some limits on direct congressional
regulation of state government."' Blackmun joined this concurrence,4
"withdrawing [his] joinder" from Marshall's opinion."
38. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Notes on Justice Marshall Draft Opinion in Fry v. United States
(Jan. 3, 1975) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 73-822).
39. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Thurgood Marshall 1 (Jan. 14,
1975) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 196, Folder 73-822).
40. Id. at 2.
41. Id.
42. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 15, 1975)
(on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 196, Folder 73-822).
43. Memorandum from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 14,
1975) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 196, Folder 73-822).
44. See Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Conference Notes in Fry v. United States 3 (Nov. 11, 1974)
(on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 73-822).
4s. Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Jan. 16, 1975)
(on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 73-822).
46. Memorandum from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 17,
1975) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 73-822).
47. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Second Draft Concurrence Opinion in Fry v. United States
(Mar. 20, 1975) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 196, Folder 73-822).
48. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Mar. 20,
1975) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 196, Folder 73-822) ("Please join me in
your separate concurring opinion.").
49. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Mar. 20,




When Burger too agreed to join the concurrence,"o Marshall- sensing a
rebellion -stood down. He circulated a new draft that omitted the expansive
language upholding Wirtz and focused on both the temporary nature of the
statute in question and the emergency conditions that required it." Powell, in
turn, agreed to drop his concurrence, writing on his hard copy of the draft, "As
J[ustice] Marshall incorporated most of this in his opinion for the Court, I
withdrew this."s" He, Blackmun, and the Chief Justice rejoined Marshall's
majority.s" In a note that Blackmun wrote to himself for his files, Blackmun
reported that Marshall was "furious at the loss of a [C]ourt" and accused
Blackmun and Powell of "conspiring to effect this result."s' Blackmun had
encouraged Marshall to incorporate Powell's contributions to stave off such a
feud, but Marshall had "peremptorily refused."ss Justice Blackmun later wrote
that he "voted with the majority in Fry basically on the ground of a narrow
opinion, the precedent in Wirtz, and the emergency nature of the wage controls
at issue there.", 6
In the end, Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenter. He invoked the Tenth
Amendment to argue that, even if any individual federal law created a trivial
imposition on the states, collectively permitting such laws would gravely
undermine the states' role in the federal system.' His dissent in Fry thus
foreshadowed the arguments that would take center stage in Cities, a position
that had more appeal to Justices in the seven-member Fry majority than
contemporary readers might have surmised on the basis of the majority
opinion.
50. Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Mar. 27,
1975) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 196, Folder 73-822).
51. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Third Draft Opinion in Fry v. United States 5-6 (Mar. 27, 1975)
(on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 196, Folder 73-822).
52. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Notes on Justice Powell Draft Concurrence Opinion in Fry v.
United States (Mar. 20, 1975) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 73-822).
53. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Note for the File in Fry v. United States (Apr. 8, 1975) (on file
with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 196, Folder 73-822).
54. Id.
ss. Id.
56. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun for Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery 8 (Apr.
15, 1975) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 217, Folder 74-879).
57. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 550 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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B. Reviving the Tenth Amendment: National League of Cities and the
Traditional Governmental Functions Test
Understanding Fry's genesis helps explain why Justice Rehnquist's Tenth
Amendment arguments received such an enthusiastic response only a year after
they were seemingly repudiated, seven-one, in Fry. In the wake of Wirtz,
Congress expanded the FLSA's wage and hour requirements to cover nearly all
state and local employees, effectively extending the same rules to both public
and private employers." In response, the plaintiffs in Cities argued both that
Congress had overstepped its Commerce Clause powers and, picking up Justice
Rehnquist's cue, that Congress had violated the Tenth Amendment.s"
During the conference for Cities,6o each of the Nixon appointees sought to
overturn the FLSA amendments, but not necessarily Wirtz. This was hardly
surprising given the threatened rebellion of the Chief Justice and Justices
Powell and Blackmun in Fry.61 While all four voted at conference to reverse the
lower court and hold the amendments unconstitutional, none was certain of
the precise legal rationale. Justice Powell perhaps put it best in a memo he
circulated before conference: "The problem is how best to accommodate the
commerce clause and federalism when they collide.,62 Powell thought
Congress had gotten carried away in the most recent FLSA expansion. 63 His
58. Act of Apr. 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 55, 58-62.
59. Brief for Appellants at 98, Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (No. 74-878).
6o. One of the most remarkable and important parts of Justice Blackmun's papers is his
meticulous notes on the Court's conferences after oral arguments. Justice Powell, too,
retained his detailed conference notes. Both sets of material shed light on this closed-door
setting. Conference debates might be the best opportunity to understand what each
individual Justice thought about a given case, but because the Justices are tight-lipped about
their discussions, any recordings have become available only posthumously. When the
Justices meet after oral arguments, they traditionally present their positions in order of
seniority, with the Chief Justice speaking first. Unless uncertain of a position, each Justice
will also render a preliminary vote, and thus by the end of the conference a majority will
often emerge. The process, particularly in these federalism cases, is revealing. See, e.g.,
LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN's SUPREME COURT
JOURNEY 57-59 (2005).
61. The discussion of the conference for Cities is drawn from Justice Blackmun's meticulous, but
sometimes illegible conference notes, as well as Justice Powell's less copious notes. Any
errors in transcription are mine, although I have strived to present only those portions of the
notes I can confidently transcribe. See Justice Harry A. Blacknun, Conference Notes in Nat'l
League of Cities v. Dunlop (Apr. 18, 1975) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 217,
Folder 74-878); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Conference Notes in Nat'l League of Cities v.
Dunlop (Apr. 18, 1975) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 74-878).





memo displayed far more certainty about the desired outcome than about the
means to achieve it. His comments at conference were representative of the
new Nixon appointees: he was convinced that the Court would need to draw
some sort of clear line -after all, if the Court did not, who would? 64 He stated
that he "would prefer to limit Wirtz to its facts . . . but would consider
overruling if necessary."s6
The other Nixon appointees agreed that the amendments were
problematic, but they too were uncertain whether to overturn Wirtz or to try to
distinguish Cities from Wirtz on the facts. The Chief Justice and Blackmun
shared Powell's inclination to limit Wirtz to its facts, and while Rehnquist - the
sole dissenter in Fry-was open to overturning Wirtz, he wondered whether
that was necessary given the Court's latitude to react to different situations.
The Court's older members were more steadfast. Brennan, White, and
Marshall supplied three reliable votes to affirm the district court and uphold
the law.6 " Brennan and White both remarked that Cities was essentially Wirtz
redux.6 8 That left the two Wirtz dissenters. Justice Douglas, recovering from a
debilitating stroke he had suffered over the Court's Christmas holiday, 69 Was
absent from the conference7 0 Evincing his respect for stare decisis, Justice
Stewart stated that he would vote to overrule Wirtz if he could "join five" -a
majority in its own right -in doing so.'
With Douglas absent, no clear majority view on how to deal with Wirtz,
and the term rapidly closing, the Justices held the case over for reargument. By
the time the case was reargued in March 1976, Justice Douglas had stepped
down from the Court and Justice Stevens, President Ford's sole nominee, had
been elevated.'
Although the intervening eleven months provided the Justices with the
opportunity to solidify their views, some members of the Court- especially
Chief Justice Burger-remained unsure how to articulate a clear doctrinal
64. Blackmun, supra note 61.
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Hall et al. eds., 1992).
70. Blackmun, supra note 61.
71. Powell, supra note 6i.
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holding.' The Chief Justice, speaking first, stated that the law was "the
antithesis of what [he] regard[ed] as [a] fed[eral] sys[tem]," because he
thought there ought to be variance between the states within a federal system. 4
Nevertheless, Burger was still uncertain whether-and how-to overturn
Wirtz, and so voted to overturn the district court but not Wirtz itself. White,
presumably sensing that Wirtz could end up on the chopping block, noted that
even the appellants in the case had not asked the Court to overturn Wirtz or
reconsider whether Wirtz was decided correctly.' He would vote to affirm, as
would Brennan and Marshall, who noted that the Court was not starting from
a "clean slate" -perhaps a reminder to the newer Justices of the importance of
stare decisis given the rebellion Marshall had faced in Fry. 6
Brennan, who wanted to uphold the law, may have been influenced by the
law's effect on individual employees, many of whom had reached out to him in
correspondence. The files of Justices Brennan and Blackmun reveal that they
kept many letters they received from ordinary citizens. Brennan, for example,
retained a moving handwritten letter from a Virginia firefighter who had
worked as many as eighty-four hours in a week without a cent of overtime pay.
The firefighter wrote that neither he nor his family ever "begrudged the fact
that I am only home half the time that other men are home with their families"
or that he had "to work on Sundays, [the] 4 th of July, Christmas Day, etc.,"
but that it was unfair that he was not eligible for overtime when other
employees might be.' The firefighter beseeched Brennan to uphold the FLSA,
telling him "my future is definitely in your hands."7
Justices Powell and Rehnquist also resumed their postures from the earlier
conference. Powell felt it was the Court's role to preserve the federal system,
and that strict scrutiny should apply because, in Powell's view, Congress could
regulate the states' internal affairs only when necessary to protect federal
interests. He concluded that there was no principled way to preserve both
the federal system and the FLSA amendments. Overturning the amendments
was "a matter of survival" for the federal system, and so he voted to
73. The discussion of the conference is drawn from the notes of Justices Blackmun and Powell.
See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery (Mar. 5,
1976) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 217, Folders 74-878, 74-879); Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Conference Notes in Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery (Mar. 5, 1976) (on
file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 74-878).
74. Blackmun, supra note 73.
7s. Id.
76. Id.
77. Letter from Carl B. Helton to Justice William J. Brennan (Feb. 24, 1976) (on file with
William J. Brennan Papers, Box 1:381, Folder 74-878-1).
78. Id.
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overturn Wirtz.' Rehnquist, the lone dissenter in Fry, was quite willing to do
so. 8 o Stevens-the newest Justice - then stated that he was "not persuaded by
the parade of horribles" that the cities and states threatened would ensue
should the Court uphold the federal law." He joined Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and White in voting to affirm.
The only remaining dissenter from Wirtz on the Court, Stewart, held fast
to his earlier position that the Court could not hold that the Commerce Clause
denied Congress such extensive powers yet simultaneously maintain that Wirtz
was good law. In essence, he believed that there was no room to distinguish
Wirtz on its facts. But this time, rather than agreeing only to "join five,"
Stewart stated that he would overrule Wirtz if just four others joined him.
This brought the tally to an even four-four. It then fell to Justice Blackmun to
cast the decisive vote.
C. Blackmun as the Tie-Breaker
This was not an unfamiliar position for Justice Blackmun. In his early years
on the Court, he often found himself to be the deciding vote.8' As many
scholars have observed, Blackmun appeared to drift over time from the Burger
Court's conservative wing (anchored by the Chief Justice and Justice
Rehnquist) to its liberal wing (anchored by Justices Brennan and Marshall).8
Blackmun often said that he did not change -the Court did."s But Blackmun's
views on federalism were not so simple. Blackmun was never as hardened a
champion of states' rights as Chief Justice Burger or Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor. Blacknun came of age during the Great Depression, an experience
79. Blackmun, supra note 73.
so. Id.
si. Id.
82. Powell, supra note 73.
83. For example, as Linda Greenhouse has documented, when Justice Blackmun assumed his
position on the Supreme Court in 1970, he was immediately put in the position of casting
the deciding vote on most of the twenty-two pending certiorari petitions before the Court.
See GREENHOUSE, supra note 6o, at 53-54.
84. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, justice Blackmun, Federalism and Separation of Powers, 97 DICK. L.
REV. 541, 571 (1993) (noting the possibility that Blackmun purposefully moved left to keep
the Court balanced once O'Connor's appointment in place of the retiring Justice Stewart
caused the Court to move right); Joseph F. Kobylka, The Court, Justice Blackmun, and
Federalism: A Subtle Movement with Potentially Great Ramifications, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 9,
13 (1985) (noting that Blackmun had drifted away from voting with the Chief Justice and
increasingly voted with his "ideological and intellectual adversary," Justice Brennan).
85. See Nina Totenberg, Hary A. Blackmun: The Conscientious Conscience, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 745,
745 (1994).
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that, according to former clerk Mark Rahdert, now a professor at Temple
University's Beasley School of Law, had a lasting impact on him. 86 Blackmun
saw New Deal legislation lift the country from the Great Depression and felt
strongly that the federal government must be able to solve national problems. 87
This gave him a correspondingly expansive view of Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause.
On the other hand, Blackmun recognized the need for limits on the reach of
the federal government's power over the states. Blacknun was not the Tenth
Amendment adherent Rehnquist was, but he nonetheless acknowledged that
" [w]e have emasculated state operations exceedingly in the past .... Does the
Tenth Amendment have any meaning at all? If we affirm here it has
comparatively little meaning."98 Blackmun was also not especially persuaded
by the government's argument for the necessity of the FLSA amendments. His
clerk's bench memo noted that several states supported the FLSA out of a
"race-to-the-bottom" concern that interstate rivalry and competition could
prevent individual states from adequately protecting their own employees.
Blackmun skeptically wrote in the margins: "How?"o As he wrote in a
memorandum to the Conference shortly before oral arguments, "[I]t would
not disturb me too much to have State employees' wages on a slightly lower
level than those in private enterprise."" Justice Powell put it even more clearly
in his memo to the Court before conference: "[M] ore than a third of a century
has passed since FLSA was enacted . . . . I know of no finding that this
regulation is necessary-at this late date-to effectuate the basic objectives of
the Act."" Blackmun was also concerned about the practical consequences of
the Court's decisions. In preparing for oral argument, Blacknun sought to
understand the fiscal impact of Wirtz on state and local governments, and
whether this impact "really interfered with the states' sovereignty.""
Ultimately, Blacknun determined that the only way for the Court to
maintain the proper balance between the federal government and the states
was to overrule Wirtz. Nevertheless, Blackmun stated at conference that he
86. Telephone Interview with Mark Rahdert, October Term 1982 Clerk to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 18, 2014).
87. Id.
88. Id.
8g. See Blackmun, supra note 56.
go. Memorandum from Karen Nelson Moore, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun 2 (Apr. 11, 1975) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 217, Folder 74-879).
91. See Blackmun, supra note 56, at 7.
92. Powell, supra note 1, at 4.




would not want to write the decision, 9 4 suggesting that he, like the Chief
Justice, could not precisely articulate his legal theory. With four votes to
overrule Wirtz, the members of the emergent majority-the Chief Justice and
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun-picked up Justice Stewart, who
was willing to join them in overturning both the FLSA amendments and the
Wirtz precedent upon which the government had relied.95 The Tenth
Amendment would live again, and - for the first time since the famous
federalism confrontations of the New Deal-the Court would strike down a
federal law enacted under Congress's Commerce Clause powers.
D. A Decision in Search ofa Doctrine
Although Justice Blackmun was confident in his preferred outcome, he
remained unsure how to articulate the rationale. A close examination of
Blackmun's papers suggests that his unusual concurrence in Cities was
influenced by his clerk, who insisted that Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
had troubling implications. Blacknun vacillated between his disagreement
with Rehnquist's reasoning and his desire to support Rehnquist's outcome.
Despite Blaclmun's willingness to join the majority in overruling Wirtz, his
skepticism grew as the case came closer to a decision, especially when
Rehnquist circulated an early draft.
Although Rehnquist devoted much of his opinion to the real-world costs
the FLSA might impose on state services -concerns that motivated Blackmun
to join the majority in the first place -Rehnquist's opinion also went much
further. Rehnquist categorically rejected Congress's ability to "displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions., 6 Far from carefully balancing federal and state
interests, Rehnquist seemed to articulate a per se rule that would reject nearly
any federal displacement of the states in areas that were traditionally state-
government functions. Although Rehnquist recognized "attributes of
sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by
Congress," he made little effort to explain what these attributes might be, or
how one might identify them.97 This would ultimately prove fatal to the long-
term viability of Cities.
94. See Blackmun, supra note 73.
es. Id.
96. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
97. Id. at 845. Apart from the setting of salaries and overtime policies of state employees,
Rehnquist provided only one other example of such an attribute of sovereignty: the power
to seat a state's capital. Id.
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Blackmun agreed with Rehnquist that Congress went too far with the
FLSA, but his reasons were narrower, focusing on the difference between
"Congress telling the states you must [as in Cities], versus telling the states you
must not [as in Fry]. 98 justice Blackmun's clerk on the case, William H. Block,
prepared a bench memo for the Justice arguing that Rehnquist's opinion was
"legally wrong and [would] create serious problems for the Court in future
cases." 99 Block argued that Rehnquist's traditional governmental functions
approach would effectively reinstate the governmental/proprietary distinction
that had fared poorly in several federal tax immunity cases before being
discarded in New York v. United States in 1946.00 According to Rehnquist's
reasoning, Block argued, even if a hospital were discharging harmful waste into
interstate waters, the federal government could not regulate it on account of
the state hospital's "governmental" function."o1 Block noted the problems that
would arise in attempting to identify whether the provision of mass transit was
clearly a government function, 02 foreshadowing the issues in United
Transportation Union v. Long island Railroad Co. and Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority that would ultimately cause the Court -led by
Blackmun- to overturn Cities.
Blackmun was uneasy with aspects of Rehnquist's majority opinion, but
found Brennan's strident dissent even less appetizing. Observing this, Block
urged Blackmun to write a special concurrence."o3 Blackmun was interested,
but initially wondered how to distinguish his position. Block pushed Blackmun
to repudiate Rehnquist's governmental/proprietary distinction, which the
Court had rejected in New York and in another case, United States v.
98. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes in Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery (on file
with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 217, Folder 74-879).
99. Memorandum from William H. Block, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun 1 (May 11, 1976) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 217, Folder 74-
879).
100. Id. at 7 ("I note that Justice Stone, in Gerhardt, declared that there were two circumstances
under which there would be no tax immunity: i) where the state is engaged in a
'proprietary' as opposed to a 'governmental' function.. . . The 'governmental/proprietary'
distinction was rejected by seven justices (including Justice Stone) in New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)."). Block noted that the Court in New York had concluded that
the distinction was "too shifting a basis for determining constitutional power and too
entangled in expediency to serve as a dependable legal criterion." Id. at 8-9 (quoting New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 580 (1946)).
iol. Id. at 16.
102. Id.




California."' These cases, Block argued, supported a balancing approach in
assessing whether the federal government's interests outweighed the impact of
the law on the states.10 5
Nevertheless, while Rehnquist's per se rule was perhaps too sweeping, it
at least supported the decision to overturn Wirtz. As Block told Blackmun,
relying on a balancing test to reject the application of the FLSA to the states
would be more difficult here, since "the interference with the state is not very
drastic . . . . [T]he 'intrusion' comes down simply to increased costs."to,6
Knowing that Blackmun was firmly wedded to preserving a broad role for the
federal government in environmental regulation, 0 7 Block was careful to note
that it would be difficult to "write such an opinion [relying on a balancing test
approach] and still preserve federal options such as environmental regulation
of state facilities.
Justice Blackmun's papers include several discarded drafts of his
concurrence in Cities. Blacknun's original draft attempted to explain more fully
how the balance in this case favored the states.0 9 Yet he eventually cut much of
it, and with each draft, Blackmun's concurrence became shorter and vaguer.
His original draft echoed Justice Powell's statement at conference"o: "I regard
this as one of the most important constitutional cases that have come to the
Court in recent years.""' Perhaps because Blackmun was concerned that this
would extend the reach of Rehnquist's opinion, he dropped this language.
Another draft ended with an attempt to speculate as to a limiting principle:
"Perhaps, although I am not now certain, the distinction is that between
federal legislation that says to the states 'thou shalt' and federal legislation that
104. Id.; see also New York, 326 U.S. at 583 ("[W]e decide enough when we reject limitations
upon the taxing power of Congress derived from such untenable criteria as 'proprietary'
against 'governmental' activities of the States .... ); United States v. California, 297 U.S.
175, 183 (1936) ("[W]e think it unimportant to say whether the state conducts its railroad in
its 'sovereign' or in its 'private' capacity.").
105. See Memorandum from William H. Block to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 99, at 7-
10.
io6. Id. at 19.
107. See Telephone Interview with Mark Rahdert, supra note 86.
108. Memorandum from William H. Block to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 99, at 20.
iog. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, First Draft Concurrence in Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery i (on
file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 217, Folder 74-878).
11o. See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Nat'l League of Cities v. Dunlop (Mar.
5, 1976) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 217, Folder 74-878).
ill. See Blackmun, supra note 109.
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says 'thou shalt not.""' 2 This too was omitted in the final version. An even later
draft stated that Blackmun could not agree with the reasoning of the majority
opinion "insofar as it treats the federal interest as irrelevant .... I can read the
opinion as a whole only as announcing an absolute ban on federal interference
with aspects of 'state sovereignty'; and I must disagree."' For whatever
reason, Blackmun cut this too, perhaps because it would be difficult to retain
this language yet nevertheless join the majority.
Ultimately, Blackmun declined to elaborate on his views and provided a
terse, one-paragraph concurrence stating simply that, on the basis of a
balancing test, in this particular case, he agreed with the majority:
The Court's opinion and the dissents indicate the importance and
significance of this litigation as it bears upon the relationship between
the Federal Government and our States. Although I am not untroubled
by certain possible implications of the Court's opinion -some of them
suggested by the dissents -I do not read the opinion so despairingly as
does my Brother Brennan. In my view, the result with respect to the
statute under challenge here is necessarily correct. I may misinterpret
the Court's opinion, but it seems to me that it adopts a balancing
approach, and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as
environmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably
greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal
standards would be essential. With this understanding on my part of
the Court's opinion, I join it.114
In response to Blackmun's invocation of the balancing test rationale,
Brennan chose to amend his dissent, adding a paragraph criticizing the
balancing-test approach as "a thinly veiled rationalization for judicial
supervision of a policy judgment that our system of government reserves to the
Congress.""s Brennan appeared to be invoking the process federalism
arguments of Herbert Wechsler, the renowned Columbia Law School professor
whose federal courts textbook remains - more than sixty years after its
112. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Draft Concurrence in Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery 1-2 (on file
with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 217, Folder 74-878). The quoted material has been
crossed out in pencil, likely indicating Blackmun's decision to eliminate this phrasing. Id.
113. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, June 1976 Draft Concurrence in Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery 1
(on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 217, Folder 74-878).
114. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(internal citation omitted).
115. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. for Conference in Nat'l League of Cities




publication - among the most influential casebooks in American legal
education.", 6 Wechsler believed that Congress, not the courts, was best situated
to calibrate the balance between the states and the federal government. In his
classic article The Political Safeguards of Federalism, Wechsler concluded that
since Congress was composed of representatives from individual states,
"Congress rather than the Court . .. on the whole is vested with the ultimate
authority for managing our federalism."" 7  While Wechsler's "process
federalism""" argument did not prevail in Cities, it would later carry the day in
Garcia, with Blackmun as its reformed flag bearer."'
Cities created an immediate uproar among constitutional-law scholars.
Many law review articles fretted over Cities's meaning, its immediate
consequences, and its potential impact on future federal laws.' Scholars were
quick to note that Cities "upse[t] previous notions of the federal-state
relationship" by articulating, for the first time, a state sovereignty limitation on
Congress's Commerce Clause power.'' As one law professor put it at the time,
"Without a doubt the decision will be roundly condemned by constitutional
scholars."" Another professor similarly criticized the decision, calling state
116. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (1953). The casebook is now in its seventh edition. See RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET
AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (7th ed. 201s).
117. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 560 (1954).
118. See William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 147-48 (1998).
iig. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985) ("State sovereign
interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power. The
effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests is apparent
even today in the course of federal legislation.").
120. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1194 (1977) ("Analyzed to the bottom,
the NLC decision proves insupportable except as it depends on a perception that 'states as
states' under the Constitution are imbued with affirmative duties towards their citizens.");
Billups P. Percy, National League of Cities v. Usery: The Tenth Amendment Is Alive and
Doing Well, 51 TUL. L. REV. 95, io6-07 (1976) (describing Cities as a "momentous" decision
that recognized significant autonomy for states as "indispensable to the genius of our federal
system"); Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and
Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. REv. io65, 1076 (1977)
(arguing that in Cities, the Court provided the states with leeway to afford their citizens
basic government services guaranteed by the Constitution).
121. William J. Kilberg & Linda Batchelder Fort, National League of Cities v. Usery: Its Meaning
and Impact, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 613, 617 (1977).
122. Barber, supra note 30, at 164.
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sovereignty, "[l]ike Hamlet's father, . . . a ghost that refuses to remain in
repose .... The evil that may be done by raising the ghost of state sovereignty
may . . . outlive the immediate decision of the Court." 1 2 The decision also
received considerable attention in the popular press, and a number of the
Justices paid attention, as their files show. Several, including Justice Brennan,
kept newspaper articles on Cities in their files.'
The doctrinal furor prompted leading constitutional law scholars Frank
Michelman and Laurence Tribe to pen twin essays in the Yale Law journal and
Harvard Law Review, respectively. Both sought to use Cities for their own ends.
Tribe admitted he made "no claims about what the Justices intended or 'really
had in mind"' and "doubt[ed] that the conclusion of this Article" was what the
Justices sought to achieve." Nevertheless, both his article and Michelman's
were attempts to "enlist that logic [of Cities]"126 for purposes of their own,
arguing that Cities could be used to support a claim for enhanced personal
rights under the Constitution.
Both provided creative interpretations of Cities. Since Darby had permitted
the FLSA's application to private employers in the states, Michelman argued
that the only way to square Darby and Cities was to recognize the crucial
difference between private employers and states and municipalities; the latter
provide essential public services to citizens that Congress may not impair
through federal laws.12 7 If so, then "states as states" under the Constitution
may have affirmative duties toward their citizens.`8 Tribe followed a similar
logic to conclude that if the Court was protecting the states because they
provide basic government services to citizens, then by that constitutional logic,
Congress could intervene to provide such services directly if and when the
states fell short."' The fact that Tribe and Michelman could seize on Cities and
use it to promote what Tribe called "a just constitutional order" suggests both
the degree of uncertainty created in the wake of the Court's decision and the
muddiness of its reasoning.
123. Bernard Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery- the Commerce Power and State
Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1115, 1115, 1134 (1978).
124. See, e.g., Editorial, The Revival of States Rights, WASH. POST, July 2, 1976, at A22 (on file with
William J. Brennan Papers, Box 1:381, Folder 74-878-1); Lesley Oelsner, The Diminishing
Right To Fight City Hall in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1976 (on file with William J. Brennan
Papers, Box 1:381, Folder 74-878-1).
125. Tribe, supra note 120, at io66.
126. Id.
127. Michelman, supra note 120, at 1194.
128. Id.




Today, with the benefit of forty years' hindsight and the release of some of
the Justices' papers, we have a far better understanding of what "the Justices
intended or 'really had in mind.""o While one set of commentators at the time
concluded that "[u]nfortunately, the Court fails to articulate clearly the new
balance between federal and state powers,""' we now know this was because
members of the Court were as uncertain about this balance as the scholars
trying to divine it from Cities.
II. A DOCTRINE IN DISREPAIR: HODEL, LONG ISLAND RAILROAD,
FERC V. MISSISSIPPI & EEOC V. WYOMING (1981-83)
Looking back on Cities, Susan Bloch and Vicki Jackson recently concluded
that Cities's "divided opinions foreshadowed almost a decade of disagreement
about how to apply [it]."" ' This Note in part challenges that account. For all of
Cities's supposed significance, the Court never once relied on Cities to overturn
a federal law, seemingly beating a near-constant retreat from it. Far from
disagreeing on how to apply Cities, the Court's decisions during this period
appear to be a concerted exercise in avoiding its application altogether.
While most scholars focus on Garcia's explicit repudiation of Cities nine
years later, Justice Rehnquist's pro-states coalition never really gained traction
in the first place. Justice Blackmun's papers and notes show the Court scaling
back Cities at every turn as it struggled to apply the "traditional governmental
functions" analysis to real-world cases. Curiously, in the first two cases in
which the Burger Court had the opportunity to apply its Cities holding, even
the conservative, pro-states members of the Court endorsed the expansion of
federal law. This was in part, I argue, because Cities's traditional governmental
functions test presented probusiness, pro-states conservatives with a catch-22:
either deny the viability of private alternatives to public programs by deeming
them "traditional governmental functions," or stand by and permit the
expansive reach of the federal government.
A. Hodel, Long Island Railroad, and the Dysfunction of the Traditional
Governmental Functions Test
The pattern of retreat began in the very first major federalism case to come
before the Court after Cities: Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
130. Id. at io66.
131. Kilberg & Fort, supra note 121, at 617.
132. SUSAN Low BLOCH & VICKI C. JACKSON, FEDERALISM: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 183 (2013).
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Ass'n. The 1981 case concerned the reach of the federal government to
regulate coal mining. In Hodel, the Court avoided applying Cities by
recharacterizing its holding as establishing a three-part test. To invalidate
Congress's actions as a violation of the Tenth Amendment, the Court stated
that challenged legislation must (1) regulate the "States as States"; (2) "address
matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty"'; and (3)
directly impair the states' ability "to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions.""' Even then, the Court noted, a Tenth
Amendment challenge would not succeed if "the nature of the federal interest
advanced may be such that it justifies state submission."'
This proviso effectively articulated the balancing test to which Blackmun
had alluded so vaguely in his Cities concurrence, but which no other member of
the Court seemed to support at the time. Like his concurrence, the proviso
provided no explanation as to how a court might weigh such competing
factors. Strikingly, the Court voted unanimously to uphold the federal law in
Hodel. Even Justice Rehnquist, the author of Cities, joined. In subsequent
federalism cases, the Court would read Hodel as essentially superseding Cities
and elevating the standard states had to satisfy to prove a Tenth Amendment
violation-a standard the states would not once meet before the Court
explicitly overturned Cities in Garcia.
The year after Hodel, the Court once again unanimously upheld a federal
law challenged on federalism grounds in United Transportation Union v. Long
Island Railroad Co.3' This case involved employees of a state-owned railroad
who sought to strike under the federal Railway Labor Act. The Court
concluded that the operation of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce was
not a traditional governmental function in part because the railroad in question
had been acquired by the state only sixteen years prior to the litigation. The
Court therefore held that the federal law did not impair the states' ability to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions
under the third prong of the Cities-Hodel three-part test.13
Justice Blackmun's clerks remember the Court struggling to agree on even
a basic definition of a "traditional governmental function." Harold Koh, former
Dean and Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School and a clerk to Justice
Blackmun during October Term 1981, recalled an amusing debate over
133. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
134. Id. at 287-88 (quoting Nat'1 League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
135. Id. at 288 n.29.
136. Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blaclanun, J., concurring).
137- 455 U.S. 678 (1982).




"traditional governmental functions" during oral argument in Long Island
Railroad. The State tried to convince the Court that local transportation,
including subways, was a critical government function.! A geographic divide
emerged, with Justices from the West reacting skeptically to the claim that a
city should be expected to provide subway and light rail services, let alone ones
that crossed state borders. To them this was a foreign concept, whereas to the
Justices and clerks from the East Coast, the idea of New York City not
providing a subway system seemed equally absurd."o
Long Island Railroad revealed another tension in the traditional
governmental functions test: it created an analytic wedge between
conservatives favoring private enterprise and those favoring limits on the
federal government. To protect the states, the Cities test required sanctifying as
"governmental" activities that could, at least in theory, have viable private-
sector alternatives such as railroads, hospitals, and schools. At oral argument,
counsel for the railroad tried to put forward a test of "public dependen[cy]' 4'
under which "the economy and the social well-being of the City of New
York ... collapses if we don't have public transit."" For a libertarian, the Cities
test created a dilemma: to protect federalism, one had to sacrifice small
government positions and disavow the viability of free-market alternatives. It
also required arguments implausible on their face: federalism proponents in
Long Island Railroad were forced to argue that the railroad was an essential
governmental function even though it had been operated by a private
corporation until 1966, a mere sixteen years earlier. That argument, in turn, led
to an uncomfortable reality: the more it could be shown that the market could
provide effective alternatives, the fewer "traditional governmental functions"
would remain to be protected by Cities and keep federal regulators at bay.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Chief Justice Burger eagerly
dispensed with the idea that railroads were a "traditional" governmental
function in Long Island Railroad. Nor is it especially surprising that Justice
Powell would join him, given Powell's commitment to free enterprise and his
experience as an advocate on behalf of private businesses resisting the
expanding reach of the state." The Chief Justice, writing for the Court,
139. Oral Argument at 55:oo, United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455
U.S. 678 (1982) (No. 80-1925), http://www.oyez.org/cases/198o-1989/1981/1981_80-1925
#transcript-text5239 [http://perma.cc/QXD2-PETW].
140. Interview with Harold Hongju Koh, October Term 1981 Clerk to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, U.S. Supreme Court, in New Haven, Conn. (Nov. 21, 2014).
141. Oral Argument, supra note 139, at 53:23.
142. Id. at 54:42.
143. See A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal
Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 853 (2003); see also infra note 192 and accompanying text.
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dispatched with the problem by rejecting "a static historical view of state
functions," essentially denying that Cities's central inquiry was the vintage of
the state activity. Instead, he wrote, the proper test was whether the federal
regulation affected "basic state prerogatives."'s The problem, however, was
that since railroads had been operated privately for over a century, a "basic
state prerogative" could be disproven simply by pointing to the ready
availability of privately operated alternatives. While Chief Justice Burger's
explanation resolved the immediate issue in Long Island Railroad, it presaged
Cities's troubled nonapplication in other Burger Court federalism cases to
come.
B. FERC v. Mississippi: O'Connor Foreshadows the "New Federalism"
The difficulty of applying Cities became even more apparent in subsequent
terms, when the Court was confronted with additional federalism challenges in
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi (FERC) 46 in 1982 and Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming (EEOC)"7 in 1983. The
Justices consistently wrestled with their positions and the practical
consequences of their decisions. Moreover, archival materials from FERC
reveal how open-minded many of the Justices were - even after oral
argument-while the papers for EEOC evince the Justices' concern with the
real-world outcomes of these often-abstract legal disputes.
FERC was a particularly complex case involving provisions of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). The provisions in question permitted
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to exempt certain power facilities
from state laws and regulations, mandated that state commissions procedurally
consider certain federal regulations, and required state commissions to
implement the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's procedural rules
when settling disputes arising under the statute.
The majority coalition in FERC shifted substantially in the months before
the decision was handed down. What began as a seemingly solid seven-two
majority turned into a narrow five-four decision. In hindsight, FERC stands
out as an example of a case in which seemingly resolute majority and
144. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 686.
145. Id. at 686-87.
146. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
147. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
148. FERC, 456 U.S. at 747 ("PURPA requires each state regulatory authority and nonregulated





dissenting coalitions were, at least at first, far more ambivalent behind the
scenes than their published opinions suggested. The certainty evinced by the
opinions was the result of debate, dueling drafts, and shifting alliances. Even as
Cities's traditional governmental functions doctrine fell into disrepair, new
arguments in favor of the states were being developed by the newest Justice on
the Court- and President Reagan's first nominee - Sandra Day O'Connor.
In dissent, Justice O'Connor would ultimately throw down the gauntlet
on behalf of the states. Her opinion would presage the Rehnquist Court's
"new federalism" decisions of the 199os, including the anticommandeering and
anticoercion principles she would later articulate in New York v. United
States.`' O'Connor's opinion was also noteworthy because FERC was the first
federalism case since Justice O'Connor replaced Stewart on the Court. Stewart
had been a reliable vote for the states in federalism cases like Wirtz and Cities.
But O'Connor, a former Arizona state representative and elected state appellate
court judge, was an even more unabashed champion of state sovereignty and
skeptic of federal intervention in state affairs.so Koh, who clerked the year
FERC was decided, speculated that O'Connor may have chosen FERC as a
means to establish herself in her first term on the Court.'I
At conference, even those members of the Court more sympathetic to the
states, such as the Chief Justice and Justice Powell, were unsure what to make
of the challenge."s2 Initially, the Chief Justice "tentatively" said he would find
the procedural requirements unconstitutional but the substantive ones within
Congress's permissible powers's: he "would give Congress a wide scope in
problems of this kind,"" but was "less sure about the imposed procedural
requirements."' 5 Over the course of the discussion, however, he seemed to
come around to reversing across the board, finding all provisions
constitutional.xs
149. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
iso. For more on Justice O'Connor's views on federalism and state sovereignty, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Justice O'Connor and Federalism, 32 McGEoRGE L. REv. 877 (2001).
151. See Interview with Harold Hongju Koh, supra note 140.
152. The discussion of the conference is drawn from the notes of Justices Blackmun and Powell.
See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes in FERC v. Mississippi (Jan. 22, 1982) (on
file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 352, Folder 80-1749); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Conference Notes in FERC v. Mississippi (Jan. 22, 1982) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Papers, Folder 80-1749).
153. Powell, supra note 152.
154. Blackmun, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. Powell, supra note 152.
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One question was how to deal with the fact that Congress could have easily
preempted state regulation in this area. Justice Brennan voted to uphold on the
basis that Congress could have preempted the states entirely-and so
mandating mere consideration of certain federal prerogatives was less intrusive
by comparison.' Yet Congress had never preempted the states in this area,
Justice Powell noted, and he wondered whether this omission was telling.s8
Powell was hesitant to overturn the law: "Do I have the nerve to say Congress
doesn't have this power?"'59 He decided to uphold the substantive
requirements of PURPA but sustain the district court's rejection of its
procedural requirements. While Justice White was more hesitant than
Brennan, noting that the procedural requirements were new territory for the
Court, he nonetheless voted to uphold the law, as did Justice Marshall.,6 ,
Justice Stevens would vote to uphold all of PURPA, also pointing to
Congress's uncontested ability to preempt the states' laws entirely.'
Justice Blackmun, like Justice Burger and Justice Powell, was ambivalent
about the constitutionality of PURPA's procedural requirements, stating that
he could reverse "across the board, I guess.",, 6 ' Nevertheless there seemed to be
a growing consensus that the substantive requirements were a permissible
exercise of Congress's power. According to former Blacknun clerk Rahdert,
Blackmun had always been more amenable to state power in the regulation of
energy and environmental concerns (the concerns raised in FERC) than in
employment law (the issue in Cities) .16' Even Rehnquist, the ardent defender of
states in Cities, concluded that Congress could preempt the states in energy
matters since the law was of national necessity; he would sustain it on that
basis, citing Fry. But he, too, was skeptical of the procedural requirements.
Last was the Court's newest member, Justice O'Connor. She agreed that
the Commerce Clause supported PURPA, but thought it raised "extremely
serious questions" under the Tenth Amendment. 6s Justice O'Connor described
at length how legislation might "impair state functions," prompting Justice
Blackmun to write that "the State Legislator is speaking" in his conference






163. See Telephone Interview with Mark Rahdert, supra note 86.





notes."6 She concluded that the procedural requirements of PURPA were
unconstitutional because they directly commanded state commissioners -who
acted in both legislative as well as judicial capacities-and "Congress should
have no power to determine priorities and procedures of state legislative
power."',6 This was an early articulation of what she would ultimately develop
as the anti-commandeering doctrine a decade later in New York.16 8 She
accordingly voted to permit the substantive requirements but find PURPA's
procedural portions unconstitutional.
Thus, the Court appeared to agree unanimously that the substantive
portions of PURPA should be upheld, but the vote on the procedural portions
remained unsettled. The Chief Justice assigned the opinion to Blackmun.
Blackmun's majority opinion would uphold the procedural provisions, but it
was not yet clear who would comprise this majority. O'Connor and Powell
were dead set against the procedural provisions, but several others, including
Burger and Rehnquist, were hesitant-as the papers reveal, both would
eventually flip, persuaded by Justice O'Connor's fervent dissent.
Blackmun's papers in the case at times provide evidence of discarded
arguments. As Blackmun drafted the majority opinion in FERC, his papers
suggest that he wanted to draw on Wechsler's political safeguards of
federalism argument. Blackmun had asked one of the Supreme Court's
librarians, Penny Hazelton, to research the voting history of PURPA, especially
how members of the Mississippi delegation had voted.' Hazelton reported
that both of Mississippi's senators and two of its five House members had
voted against the Act." Given the Mississippi delegation's apparent lack of
enthusiasm for PURPA, Blackmun seems to have thought better of this
process-federalism point, as he did not mention the delegation's position, nor
Wechsler's political-safeguards argument, in his final opinion.' Nevertheless,
Blackmun would not abandon the argument indefinitely, and it emerged as a
central reason for his decision to overturn Cities in Garcia.
166. Id.
167. Powell, supra note 152.
168. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
16. See Memorandum from Penny Hazelton, Librarian, U.S. Supreme Court, to justice Harry
A. Blackmun (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 352, Folder 80-1749).
170. Id.
171. I contacted Hazelton to inquire as to whether Justice Blackrnun had explained his reasons
for requesting the votes of the Mississippi congressional delegation. Hazelton responded
that he had provided no explanation. This reasoning is educated guesswork on my part. See
E-mail from Penny A. Hazelton, Professor & Senior Assoc. Dean for Library and Tech.
Servs., Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, to author (Dec. 22, 2014, 11:21 AM PST) (on file with
author).
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The Justices' papers also provide a fuller picture of what each member of
the Court thought about a decision, including changes of both opinion and
position. Unless a Justice drafts a separate concurrence, the Court's official
documents will never reveal the exact reasons each Justice found most
persuasive. In FERC, however, both Blackmun's majority opinion and
O'Connor's dissent evolved through back and forth with their colleagues, a
dialogue revealed in the files. When O'Connor told the other Justices that she
intended to circulate a dissent," Powell and Rehnquist said that they would
read it before committing their votes either way.' Her opinion - concurring in
part (over the substantive provisions) and dissenting in part (over the
procedural requirements) -famously began with a bang: "State legislative and
administrative bodies are not field offices of the national bureaucracy.""
O'Connor criticized Blackmun's reasoning in an opinion that would presage
the federalism holdings of the Court in subsequent cases like New York. She
drew heavily on her own background in state politics, which showed in her
emphasis on the complex and nuanced roles played by state commissioners.
For Justice O'Connor, the PURPA provisions in FERC impaired state
sovereignty more than the FLSA amendments in Cities. As O'Connor noted,
the PURPA provisions "regulate[d] the States as States," not as employers
similarly situated to private employers as in Cities.7s O'Connor pushed further:
the federal government setting state agency agendas was equivalent in its
injury to state sovereignty as mandating that state legislatures debate bills
drafted by congressional committees.7 6 Such a "dismemberment of state
government" simply could not be permitted under the Tenth Amendment.'7
Blackmun fired back, revising his opinion to add that O'Connor's account
included "apocalyptic observations" that were "overstated and patently
inaccurate."'8 Other members of the Court were more receptive to O'Connor's
172. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Feb. 16, 1982) (on
file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 351, Folder 80-1749).
173. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Feb. 16, 1982) (on file
with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 351, Folder 80-1749); Letter from Justice William H.
Rehnquist to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Feb. 17, 1982) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun
Papers, Box 351, Folder 80-1749).
174. FERC, 456 U.S. 742, 777 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
O'Connor's opening line has been widely quoted and even inspired the tide of a frequently
cited law review article on federalism. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office
Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957 (1993).
175. FERC, 456 U.S. at 779-80.
176. Id. at 781.
177. Id. at 782.




opinion, however, including the Chief Justice. He wrote that O'Connor had
"persuade[d]" him that "the Court goes too far."'79 Burger had originally
joined the majority in FERC and assigned the opinion to Blackmun; the irony
of Burger's switch did not escape Blackmun, who wrote on the margins of
Burger's memorandum announcing his switch, "[y]et he assigned the case.",,so
Powell was more restrained in his enthusiasm, concluding that while he agreed
"with much" of what O'Connor had written, he was "not entirely at rest" and
would write separately too.' Rehnquist also joined O'Connor's dissent and
thus the newest Justice had whittled Blackmun's majority upholding the
constitutionality of the procedural provisions to the minimally necessary
five. 182
Although a single Justice is selected to write for the majority coalition, as
Justice Blacknun learned in FERC, there is no guarantee the author's ultimate
conclusions will satisfy every member of the majority-or retain them. FERC
also reflects the fact that today's dissent can become tomorrow's majority: as I
discuss below, Justice O'Connor's position in FERC would ultimately prevail
before the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.
C. EEOC v. Wyoming: A Federalism Doctrine Impaired
Thrice in two years, the Court faced Tenth Amendment challenges to
Congress's Commerce Clause powers, and thrice it upheld the federal law.
Although Garcia is often perceived as a dramatic breaking point from Cities, the
cases that came before it -and the Justices' refinements in applying Cities -
show that it never really had much significance.' This is perhaps most clearly
179. Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger for Conference in FERC v. Mississippi
(Apr. 13, 1982) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 351, Folder 80-1749).
i8o. Id.
181. See Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (Apr. 12, 1982)
(on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 351, Folder 80-1749). For Powell, the
importance of state control over state judicial procedure extended to the other organs of
state government, and PURPA's requirements simply intruded too far into the core of the
states' administrative and judicial procedures. FERC, 456 U.S. at 772-75 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (Apr. 13, 1982)
(on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 351, Folder 80-1749).
183. Not everyone overlooked this decision, however. For example, Greenhouse, writing in the
New York Times, presciently noted that the majority in EEOC had "effectively overruled,
albeit not in so many words," Cities. Linda Greenhouse, Age Bias Held Binding on State
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illustrated in EEOC,8 4 where the Court, led by Cities dissenter Justice Brennan,
amicably applied Cities and yet once more upheld the federal law against the
States.
The legal challenge in EEOC was much closer to the core question raised in
Cities than the challenges in Hodel, Long Island Railroad, and FERC. As with
Cities, EEOC concerned a federal law that applied to employees and employers
regardless of whether they were public or private. Bill Crump, a Wyoming
State fish and game warden, had reached the age of fifty-five and was forced to
retire due to Wyoming's mandatory retirement policy for fish and game
wardens. Crump contacted the EEOC, which sued on his behalf, alleging
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)."' The district
court ruled against him, holding that the Tenth Amendment limited
Congress's reach over the states' hiring practices for game wardens. Ignoring
the Court's momentum away from Cities in Hodel, Long Island Railroad, and
FERC, the district court determined that Cities was "not narrowly limited":
"[a] thoughtful reading of the case as well as the furor in academic circles
created by the decision discloses that."186
Blackmun's papers on EEOC provide a stark contrast with this
understanding of Cities. One of Blackmun's clerks wrote to him, "Your
concurring opinion in National League of Cities flagged your view from the start
that the case should not have been considered 'the battle standard of the "new
federalism,"' but instead announced a very limited doctrine."'7 At conference,
talk focused on the possible real-world effects of the law. Brennan and Powell
were particularly concerned with this question.' 8 8 Brennan felt that the effects
of the ADEA's application to the states' hiring practices were overblown. 8 9
After all, Brennan argued, the state's interest in competence would be
preserved by the carveout for "bona fide occupational qualifications" (BFOQj
and the right of the state to appeal individual cases in which game wardens
were not fit to serve after retirement age.' 90
184. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
85. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 596 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
186. Id. at 598.
187. Letter from David Ogden, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A. Blackmun 1-2
(Mar. 15, 1983) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 368, Folder 81-554-2).
188. The discussion of the conference is drawn from Justice Blackmun's conference notes. See
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes in EEOC v. Wyoming (Oct. 8, 1982) (on file
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REPAIRING THE IRREPARABLE
Powell was more inclined to view the case from the perspective of
employers." He had been a corporate lawyer prior to taking the bench, and
had authored what became known as the "Powell Memorandum," which
encouraged corporations to take a more active role in lobbying, litigation, and
policy formation. 9 Powell argued that the ADEA's financial and hiring impact
would be substantial. He rejected Brennan's suggestion that the BFOQ
process provided an effective carveout, and he predicted that the net effect of
the law would be more litigation under Title VII, such that it would take
roughly three to five years to fire any employee -even for legitimate reasons.
This, Powell anticipated, could become a major cause of unemployment,'9 s
given the increased costs to employers of hiring and firing employees. On the
basis of these practical concerns, Powell voted to hold the ADEA
unconstitutional as applied to the states.96
Brennan, the senior member of the majority, was not persuaded. He kept
the opinion for himself, and in it he emphasized that the Act did not "directly
impair" the states' ability to "structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions." 9 7 As Brennan saw it, under the ADEA,
the states could "continue to do precisely what they are doing now, if they can
demonstrate that age is a 'bona fide occupational qualification' for the job of
game warden."9 8 Brennan's decision was striking in that while he nominally
upheld Cities, his application of what he called its "functional doctrine"
effectively narrowed its holding even further' 99 - something that did not escape
Blackmun's notice.o It was striking that Brennan, a Cities dissenter, was now
espousing the application of Cities as a balancing-test doctrine, effectively using
the third step of the Cities test-the direct-impairment question-to assess
(and minimize) the real-world effects of federal laws. Powell, O'Connor, and
191. See Pritchard, supra note 143, at 853.
192. See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Educ.
Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), http://law2.w1u.edu/deptimages
/Powell%2oArchives/PowellMemorandumPrinted.pdf [http://perma.cc/2QN9-5UGC].




197. EEOC, 460 U.S. 226, 237 (1983) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981)).
198. Id. at 240.
199. Id. at 236.
200. Next to this statement in Brennan's draft, Blackmun wrote "WJB dissented." See Justice
William J. Brennan, Draft Opinion in EEOC v. Wyoming 8 (Dec. 17, 1982) (on file with
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 368, Folder 81-554-1).
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Rehnquist joined the Chief Justice's dissent, which heavily emphasized the
direct impairment of the ADEA's application to the states.2o' Stevens separately
concurred, emphasizing the process-federalism argument that Congress had
the power to act under the Commerce Clause and that it was an improper
exercise of judicial power to second-guess Congress.2 o2 This, in turn, elicited a
stern dissent from Powell, joined by O'Connor, rebutting "Justice Stevens'
novel view of our Nation's history.""
By 1984, Cities was eight years old and yet still in its doctrinal infancy.
Although hailed as groundbreaking, its immediate effect on American
federalism was far more modest than scholars had predicted. Each subsequent
federalism challenge -Hodel, Long Island Railroad, FERC, and EEOC-had
ostensibly treated Cities as if it were still good law. But Cities proved impotent,
as the Court failed to apply it to overturn a single federal law. Marshall's
limited application of Cities in his three-part Hodel test, Burger's narrowing of
the traditional governmental functions test in Long Island Railroad, and
Brennan's restricted understanding of "impermissible effects" on state
governments in EEOC left Cities largely a hollow shell. Cities's focus on
traditional governmental functions seems to have meshed poorly with the
jurisprudential approaches of many Justices of the Burger Court, whose papers
reveal that they were more attuned to policy concerns and real-world effects
than Cities's demand for categorical line drawing would permit. Cities required
a binary labeling of each government function as either traditional or
proprietary. But as the Justices' struggles showed, the real world was more
complicated.
Ill. REPAIRING THE IRREPARABLE: GARCIA (1985)
Cities would meet its end two years later, in 1985, doomed only after
Blackmun's legendary flip-flop in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.o4 Blackmun was originally assigned to write an opinion upholding
Cities. His papers strongly suggest that he reconsidered on the insistence of his
law clerk and, in an abrupt about-face, voted to overturn it.
Garcia, the nail in Cities's coffin, involved a challenge to Department of
Labor (DOL) regulations that applied minimum wage and overtime
requirements under the FLSA to the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
201. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 251-64 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 244-51 (Stevens, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 265-74 (Powell, J., dissenting).




Authority (SAMTA). 2 os At conference after oral argument, the Justices once
again struggled to apply conceptual categories to real-world situations. The
debate centered on whether municipal transit could be considered a
"traditional governmental function" under Cities.2o6 Chief Justice Burger
wanted to overturn the extension of the FLSA but had to find a way to
distinguish the case from Long Island Railroad, which had unanimously held
that the railroad in question was not a traditional governmental function. The
Chief tried to argue that Long Island Railroad was "different" because that case
concerned a "real railroad," in contrast to metro transit.2 o7 Because traditional
governmental functions were not "static" concepts, he argued, these municipal
railroads were traditional governmental functions even if "real" railroads
somehow were not. o8
Four of the Chief Justice's colleagues also appeared ready to strike down
the statute. Powell was more hesitant than Burger, but agreed that the activities
constituting "traditional governmental functions" of states and cities could
change with time, including in the case of metropolitan transportation.2 o 9 For
Powell, SAMTA was distinguishable from the Long Island Railroad because
SAMTA was more local and more intrinsic to the functioning of the
municipality.2 0 Powell would vote to roll back the FLSA. O'Connor, too,
argued for overturning the statute.' Reaching the same result by different
means, she construed the third prong of the Cities test as "whether [the] federal
act interferes with local public service," which, she argued, the DOL's
regulations did." Rehnquist agreed." Blackmun said he could go either way,
but felt he had to draw a line somewhere and joined the four in a vote to
overturn the regulations."
205. Id. at 534.
206. The discussion of the conference is drawn from the notes of Justices Blackmun and Powell.
See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth. (Mar. 21, 1984) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 412, Folder 82-1913-3);
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Conference Notes in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.
(March 1984) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 82-1913, 18).
207. Blackmun, supra note 206.
208. Id.
209. See Powell, supra note 206.
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Brennan would have none of this. He did not think SAMTA could be
considered a traditional state governmental function: it was effectively a "joint
venture" between the federal government and San Antonio, since eighty
percent of the systems had become public since 1956.ms Further, SAMTA was
heavily supported by federal funding. 6 justices White and Marshall agreed."
Stevens, too, would uphold the regulations, repeating the argument he had
made in his EEOC concurrence that it was not the Court's place to second-
guess the wisdom of Congress."
Thus, there appeared to be five clear votes to overturn the FLSA as a
violation of the Tenth Amendment. Burger assigned the opinion to Blackmun,
which Blackmun later speculated was "on [Burger's] frequently stated"
preference to give opinions to the "least persuaded."219 As he began to draft the
opinion, Blackmun's clerk assigned to the case, Scott McIntosh, sought to
develop a "workable set of standards by which courts can sort out one
governmental function from another for purposes of state immunity from
federal regulation."2 0 Blackmun noted that lower courts had struggled to
identify traditional governmental functions. If he was forced to uphold Cities,
he wanted to provide a workable standard for them.
215. Id.
216. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 532 (1985) (noting that
SAMTA had received over fifty-one million dollars in federal grants).
217. Blackmun, supra note 206.
218. Id.; see EEOC, 460 U.S. 226, 250 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("My conviction that
Congress had ample power to enact this statute . . . is unrelated to my views about the
merits of either piece of legislation. . . . I also believe, contrary to the popular view, that the
burdens imposed on the national economy by legislative prohibitions against mandatory
retirement on account of age exceed the potential benefits. My personal views on such
matters are, however, totally irrelevant to the judicial task I am obligated to perform.").
21g. See Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun for Conference in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth. (June II, 1984) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 412,
Folder 82-1913-1). Justice Powell would later question the Chief Justice's judgment. When
Justice Blackmun circulated a memo to the conference announcing his switch in positions,
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from Justice Harry A. Blackmun for Conference in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth. (June 11, 1984) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 82-1913 1984 June-
July).
22o. See Memorandum from Scott McIntosh, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A.





A. A Clerk Lobbies Blackmun To Second-Guess Himself
Justice Blackmun's papers in Garcia provide striking evidence of the
influential role that judicial clerks can play in shaping their bosses'
jurisprudence." Blackmun's clerk, McIntosh, helped set Blackmun on course
to change his mind about Cities and, with it, the fate of the Tenth Amendment.
As McIntosh examined the case law, he began "to worry whether the
distinction on which the Court is relying is either sound in theory or workable
in practice."' There were serious problems, McIntosh realized, with "trying to
provide a constitutional safe harbor for some governmental functions and not
for others."' He noted that the governmental-functions test had been
discarded as unworkable in the tax immunity case New York v. United States in
1946,2" and concluded that "[t]here is no reason to believe that a distinction
which the Court discarded as unworkable in the tax immunity field will be any
more productive in the field of regulatory immunity."'s McIntosh noted
similar instability in the lower courts' handling of Cities,2 6 including the
problem of what role history should play in determining whether a
governmental function is "traditional."" When Long Island Railroad rejected "a
static historical view of state functions generally immune from federal
regulation,"8 McIntosh concluded that it had rendered the "traditional"
requirement impotent. 9
McIntosh diagnosed another problem with trying to identify "integral" or
"necessary" governmental functions: it would not be faithful to the role of
federalism in a democratic society.23 o If the purpose of federalism was to allow
the states and their citizens to determine the nature and extent of state
involvement, then it should be left to the citizens of the states "rather than to
221. For an extensive discussion of the role of Supreme Court clerks and debates about their
influence, see TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAw CLERK (2oo6).
222. Memorandum from Scott McIntosh to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 220, at 1-2.
223. Id. at 2.
224. Id. at 6-7; see New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946) (plurality opinion).
225. See Memorandum from Scott McIntosh to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 220, at 8.
226. Id. at 8-9.
227. Id. at o-11.
228. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 686 (1982).
229. See Memorandum from Scott McIntosh to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 220, at to-
11.
230. Id. at 13.
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federal judges" to decide what policies the states should pursue and how."'
This argument drew not on the inherent limitations of the judicial craft, but
instead on a view about which federal institution should resolve federal-state
disputes. McIntosh, seemingly drawing on the process-federalism arguments
of Wechsler, argued that the states could better pursue their own ends
elsewhere than the courts. He argued that judicial intervention risked "an open
invitation for the judiciary to make Lochner-esque decisions about which state
policies they favor and which ones they dislike." 2  Instead, McIntosh
encouraged Blacknun to pursue "a different result in this case from the one
that [he] chose at Conference."" McIntosh suggested that Blackmun change
sides and overturn Cities.
As Blacknun wrestled with his draft majority opinion, he came to realize
that there was no principled way to reject the application of the FLSA
amendments to state-operated mass transit systems in light of Long Island
Railroad. Given the confusion within the lower courts, and Blackmun's
inability to construct a principled argument against the application of the
FLSA, Blackmun concluded that he must switch positions -flipping the
outcome of the entire case. Just weeks before the term's end, Blackmun
circulated a memo saying he could "find no principled way in which to affirm.
It seems to me that our customary reliance on the 'historical' and the
'traditional' is misplaced and that something more fundamental is required to
eliminate the widespread confusion in this area."
As the Justices' papers reveal, even after his switch Blackmun had not
intended to overturn Cities. Accompanying his memo was a draft opinion that
ostensibly sought a middle ground: it was critical of Cities but stopped short of
expressly overruling it.2"s Nevertheless, it so thoroughly rejected the reasoning
of Cities that readers were left wondering how Cities could remain good law.
The early draft Blackmun circulated included an extended discussion of a
nondiscrimination principle as the key limit on Congress's regulation of the
states, in a sense rewriting the test from Cities yet again. 6 According to this
231. Id. at 13-14.
232. Id. at 14.
233. Id. at 2.
234. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun for Conference in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth. (June 11, 1984) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 412,
Folder 82-1913-1).
235. See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Draft Opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth. (June 11, 1984) (on file with Byron R. White Papers, Box 11:13, Folder 82-1913-1).
236. His draft opinion read, in part, "The constitutional mechanisms for safeguarding the role of
the States are unlikely to be at risk when Congress proceeds by uniform legislation that




principle, Congress would not exceed its Commerce Clause powers under the
Tenth Amendment unless it singled out the states alone as the subject of its
regulations; as long as the regulations applied evenly to both private and public
actions, Blackmun trusted that the political system would ensure the states
would not be unduly burdened. His early draft closed by only nominally
reaffirming Cities:
Today we reaffirm the fundamental premise of National League of Cities
that Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must
accommodate the special role of the States in the federal system. We
hold, however, that the necessary accommodation between federal
power and state autonomy is realized when Congress places no burden
on the States that it has not placed on private parties as well."
This language would ultimately fall by the wayside, just like Cities.
Members of the now-former majority were surprised, to say the least. They
felt, in light of the lateness in the term and the change in the majority, that the
case should be held over for reargument." Justices Powell and O'Connor
thought the Court should ask the parties to brief Cities's continued viability -a
matter that had not been raised in the original briefings and oral arguments.
Powell may have gambled that Blackmun would ultimately blink and change
his mind again if asked to overrule Cities expressly. To that end, Powell
circulated a memo on behalf of himself and O'Connor suggesting that "it was
desirable to focus the attention of the parties broadly on the principles followed
by the Court in that case."'
not only the States' own interests but the interests of all those who are similarly situated. In
those circumstances, the structural features of the Constitution designed to protect the
States can be trusted to have served their purpose." Id. at 25.
237. Id. at 29.
238. See Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (June
11, 1984) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 82-1913 1984 June-July);
Memorandum from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor for Conference in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth. (June 11, 1984) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 82-1913
1984 June-July); Memorandum from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun (June II, 1984) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 82-1913 1984
June-July).
239. See Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (July 3,
1984) (on file with Thurgood Marshall Papers, Box 359, Folder 82-1913); Memorandum
from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. for Conference in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth. (July 3, 1984) (on file with Thurgood Marshall Papers, Box 359, Folder 82-1913).
240. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra note
239.
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Blackmun had not intended to overturn Cities, as his original draft made
plain, but he was highly critical of Cities's reasoning. Blackmun responded to
Powell with a warning: "I venture to say . . . that if the question is to be
presented, National League of Cities just might end up being overruled."21
Blackmun was not alone in his thinking; Brennan informed the Court that he
would not only join Blackmun's new majority opinion but would also "join in
such a disposition [of Cities] without hesitation."" Brennan further explained
that "[s]uch an outcome may, in fact, be required by Harry's analysis.""
B. Reargument
At reargument, the Justices trained their questions on whether Cities's
traditional governmental functions test remained a workable precedent and,
more specifically,' whether it was the judiciary's place to intervene and
protect the states in the name of federalism." With Blackmun ready to join a
new majority to overturn Cities, Brennan assigned this new majority opinion to
Blackmun. Blacknun largely followed the reasoning of the opinion his clerk
had drafted the prior term. With Cities now on the chopping block, he
abandoned his assertion of a nondiscrimination principle to protect the states
and focused instead on the longstanding and substantial federal involvement in
the provision of municipal transit.
Blackmun, as always, was focused on real-world effects. He found it
difficult to see how federal intervention could impair the states' sovereignty
when considerable federal support was necessary for metropolitan transit to
operate and remain solvent in the first place. He also drew on Wechsler's
argument about the political safeguards of federalism," 7 noting that state
interests are protected through their representation in Congress. Blackmun
then declared Cities overruled, noting that it had "departed from a proper
241. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (July 3, 1984)
(on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Folder 82-1913 1984 June-July).
242. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. for Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth. (on file with William J. Brennan Papers, Box 1:667, Folder 82-1913).
243. Id.
244. Oral Reargument at 8:22, 46:55, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985) (No. 82-1913), http://www.oyez.org/cases/198o-1989/1983/1983_82_1913#transcript
-text81685 [http://perma.cc/W5U3-FN3 51.
245. Id. at 50:43.
246. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555 ("Congress' treatment of public mass transit reinforces our
conviction that the national political process systematically protects States from the risk of
having their functions in that area handicapped by Commerce Clause regulation.").
247. See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text.
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REPAIRING THE IRREPARABLE
understanding of congressional power under the Commerce Clause." Given
the experiences of the lower courts, Cities was "both impracticable and
doctrinally barren."49 In Cities, Blackmun concluded, "the Court tried to repair
what did not need repair.""o
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor each dissented vociferously, with Powell
blasting Blackmun for flipping and "substantially alter[ing] the federal system
embodied in the Constitution."" Powell objected in particular to Blacknun's
characterization of Cities as imposing a "traditional governmental functions"
test when - Powell claimed - Cities really stood for "a familiar type of balancing
test."' Of course, this was so only because the majorities in Hodel, Long Island
Railroad, FERC, and EEOC had undercut Cities by employing a balancing test
to find no substantial impairment of state activities, however "traditional" they
might be." After all, Blackmun's concurrence in Cities, in which he advocated
a "balancing approach," was not joined by any other member of the majority
and would have been superfluous if the majority's opinion had also announced
it was undertaking a "balancing approach." Cities, long beleaguered, had finally
been laid to rest.
Lost in much of the analysis of the Burger Court's federalism doctrines was
the very central role that considerations of policy and real-world consequences
played. The swing Justices on the Court-Blackmun among them-have been
described as "pragmatists who considered cases on their individual facts."
Examination of the archives confirms that the Justices were no mere ivory-
tower abstractionists; they took seriously the law's effects on ordinary people.
After the Court handed down its decision in Garcia, Justice Blackmun retained
several letters sent by state and local employees which informed him that
Garcia had eliminated their option to choose "comp time" -the option to take
time away from work without drawing on sick leave or vacation time -in lieu
of overtime pay. One such letter, signed by dozens of employees of the City of
248. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557; see also John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards ofFederalism, 70 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1311, 1312 (1997) ("Garcia explicitly adopted [Wechsler's] academic theory
concerning the nature of the Constitution and the political process in order to justify its
finding of nonjusticiability.").
249. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.
25o. Id.
251. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 562.
253. Justice Rehnquist, in a short, separate dissent, noted as much: "Justice Powell's reference to
the 'balancing test' approved in National League of Cities is not identical with the language in
that case." Id. at 579 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
254. See BERNARD SCHwARTz, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION
400-01 (1990).
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Perrysburg, Ohio, asked that they be allowed the choice of taking "comp time"
in order to enjoy activities such as "an afternoon with out of town guests,
or .. . attend[ing] a child's school program.""s They beseeched the Justices to
revise their ruling to permit the flexibility to choose "comp time" instead of
overtime.
Although Blackmun obviously could not effect such an outcome himself, he
followed Congress's response diligently. His files on Garcia reveal that he kept
up with congressional efforts to amend the FLSA to permit "comp time" for
employees of state and local governments in lieu of overtime. 6 Sure enough,
Congress would amend the FLSA later that year, granting just such an
option. 57 In this sense, Blackmun was vindicated in his belief that the
responsibility to calibrate the balance between federal and state policies should
rest primarily with Congress.
EPILOGUE: FROM THE ASHES OF TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTIONS RISES THE iNEW FEDERALISM"
Justice Blackmun closed his opinion in Garcia with the observation that, in
retrospect, Cities sought to repair a federal-state balance that never needed
repairing. Yet if the Burger Court failed to repair American federalism, the
Court did refine it. The archival sources suggest that striking the appropriate
balance between the states and the federal government was more a process of
trial and error than of simple deduction from constitutional logic. In the case of
the Burger Court's "traditional governmental functions" test, the trials led
mostly to error. The Court's many contentious five-four decisions show as
much, as do the internal struggles of the Justices revealed in their papers. They
also confirm an observation articulated most clearly by Heather Gerken: that
the Supreme Court has struggled at times to limit federal power without
violating the rules of craft - of articulating well-formulated doctrines that not
only enjoy the force of law, but also the respect of a profession that prizes
technical merit, sophistication, and deftness.
255. See Letter from Betty C. Barbe, Emp., City of Perrysburg, Ohio, to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun (July 17, 1985) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 412, Folder 82-1913-
256. See S. REP. No. 99-159 (1985) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 412, Folder 82-
1913-5).
257. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. 55 201-219); Wage & Hour Div., Fact Sheet #7: State and Local
Governments Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. DEP'T LAB. (2011), http://
www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs 7 .pdf [http://perma.cc/4ULP-AYZ4].




Shortly after Garcia came down, as if writing Cities's eulogy, Martha A.
Field described Garcia as finally recognizing that "the Constitution is too sharp
a sword to be unsheathed, save as a last resort in the most extreme of
situations."259 But although the Court has struggled, it has not ceased trying.
Field spoke too soon in predicting that the Tenth Amendment sword would go
back in the stone: it has struck again, and repeatedly. Like Cities itself, Garcia
was merely a temporary triumph for one set of views on American
federalism.'o Dissenting in Garcia, soon-to-be Chief Justice Rehnquist
correctly foresaw the Court's trajectory in this area. He was "confident" that
the principle espoused in Cities would "in time again command the support of
a majority of this Court."a6 1 O'Connor similarly predicted that "this Court will
in time again assume its constitutional responsibility" to define the scope of
state autonomy under the Constitution.6
Sure enough, a mere seven years later, Justice O'Connor again invoked the
Tenth Amendment in New York v. United States, articulating what has since
become known as the "anti-commandeering" doctrine. 6 ' New York concerned
Congress's ability to require states to accept ownership of radioactive waste or
regulate according to the instructions of Congress. 6 ' While Justice O'Connor's
anticommandeering holding was new, the term "anti-commandeering" was
borrowed from a familiar source. O'Connor cleverly seized on a passing
observation in the Burger Court's Hodel opinion-a unanimous decision
upholding federal action-and wrote that Congress lacked the ability to
"commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program."265 Neither her
language nor her approach was made from whole cloth; as one of Blackmun's
clerks observed, O'Connor's dissent in FERC was very much a trial run for her
opinion in New York. 66
259. Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a
Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84, 118 (1985).
260. Indeed, only a decade later, John C. Yoo argued in 1997 that Garcia was already "no longer
the controlling theory concerning judicial review of federalism questions." See Yoo, supra
note 248, at 1312.
261. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
262. Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
263. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
264. Id. at 175.
265. Id. at 176 (alteration in original) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
266. See Telephone Interview with Mark Rahdert, supra note 86.
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As it turns out, Justice O'Connor's approach has proven far more enduring
than the Burger Court's Cities doctrine. Expanding on Justice O'Connor's
anticommandeering doctrine, the Rehnquist Court also struck down a federal
statute on Tenth Amendment grounds in Printz v. United States in 1997.6' In
Printz, the Court rejected a federal law that obliged local law enforcement
officers to conduct background checks on handgun applicants and take certain
actions depending on the result. 68 While joining the majority, Justice
O'Connor also observed in a short concurrence that such a program, "which
directly compel[s] state officials to administer a federal regulatory program,
utterly fail[s] to adhere to the design and structure of our constitutional
scheme," reiterating once more the objections she first raised in FERC.69
More recently, the Court has relied on Justice O'Connor's partial dissent in
FERC and the decisions in New York and Printz to reject Congress's Medicaid
expansion in the Affordable Care Act in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius.7o As discussed earlier, the Court has also drawn on the
Tenth Amendment to overturn provisions of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby
County v. Holder." Arguably, the Burger Court's federalism decisions have
even influenced the Court in Commerce Clause challenges not implicating the
Tenth Amendment. In United States v. Morrison -the challenge to Congress's
Commerce Clause power to enact the Violence Against Women Act-Justice
Souter in dissent accused the majority of "reviving [the] traditional state
spheres of action" doctrine of Cities.' The Morrison majority, Souter argued,
ignored Garcia's "rejection of 'judicially created limitations' and "a priori
definitions of state sovereignty"' in finding Congress could not regulate in
"family law and other areas of traditional state regulation." 4
In addition to refining the Court's federalism doctrine, Justice O'Connor
also led the Court in crafting an ingenious escape hatch that has allowed the
Court to protect the states without having to draw the Tenth Amendment
sword from its sheath at all. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor articulated a new rule of statutory interpretation. Drawing on
the Court's state sovereign immunity doctrine, the Court held that if Congress
267. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
268. Id. at 903-04.
269. Id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
270. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
271. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). The invocation of the Tenth Amendment is striking given its absence
in earlier Voting Rights cases. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
272. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 649.




"intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear.""s
Otherwise, the Court will interpret an ambiguous federal statute so as to
"avoid a potential constitutional problem.'', 6 As Gerken has observed, the
Court relied on this clever form of constitutional avoidance federalism in Bond
v. United States.' In so doing, the Court sidestepped a determination as to
whether Congress's implementation of an international chemical weapons
treaty ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment - a deeply tangled inquiry."
The lesson from the Burger Court's troubled federalism jurisprudence,
then, is not that the Tenth Amendment cannot protect the states from the
federal government- it has, and surely will continue to do so. Rather, the
lesson is that courts can more easily referee certain federalism boundary
disputes than others. Although a simplistic reading of the Tenth Amendment
might suggest that it primarily protects "traditional governmental functions"
from congressional overreach, the story of the Burger Court federalism cases
illustrates just how difficult it is to identify such functions in practice. No
doubt learning from the challenges faced by the Burger Court, the Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts have focused less on state functions than on state officials
and the direct coercion of states by the federal government. These categories
are identified more readily and protected more easily by courts. The Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts have also developed a federalism jurisprudence that avoids
the dilemma Cities created for libertarian-minded jurists. Judges no longer
need to sanctify a public program with the label "traditional governmental
function" to save it from federal interference.
Nevertheless, modern federalism decisions are far from unanimous.
Disagreements about the relationship between the federal and state
governments are certain to remain highly contentious for the foreseeable
future. 9 Perhaps this is inevitable to some degree. As Resnik has observed,
while "many discussions of federations presume . . . that the power over a
given domain or kind of right belongs either to subunits or to the federal
government . . . the identities of both the subunits and the federated
275. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
276. Id. at 464.
277. 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (2014) ("We conclude that, in this curious case, we can insist on a clear
indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute's
expansive language in a way that intrudes on the police power of the States.").
278. See Gerken, supra note 258, at 89.
279. See, e.g., Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 128 HARv. L. REV.
1561 (2015) (arguing that the next judicial battlefield in American federalism may be the
procedures through which the federal government requires states to consent to
implementation of federal programs).
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government do not remain fixed."2so Just as federalism proponents have
emphasized Justice Brandeis's famous depiction of the states as laboratories of
democracy and experimentation,8' so too has the Court experimented. Its
federalism doctrine has, over the years, tested different articulations of essential
state functions in an attempt to demarcate federal-state boundary disputes.
This Note told the story of the difficulty that the nation's highest court
faced in trying to preserve the proper balance between the independence of the
states and the interests of the Nation, between identifying those functions of
government reserved to the states and those meriting nationwide regulation.
The story of the Burger Court's federalism cases reveals a Court capable of
learning from its own mistakes, abandoning unworkable tests, and developing
doctrines that pursue traditional ends by new means. In this sense, the Burger
Court's federalism jurisprudence illustrates the enduring insight of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s famous aphorism: "The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience. "8'
280. See Resnik, supra note 7, at 366.
281. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
282. OLVER WENDELL HoLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Paulo J.S. Pereira & Diego M. Beltran
eds., Univ. of Toronto Law Sch. Typographical Soc'y 2011) (188i), http://www.general
-intelligence.com/1ibrary/commonlaw.pdf [http://perma.cc/8GNF-S4RQ].
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